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Abstract
New Zealand’s Resource Management Act is frequently criticised 
for the costs and delays it imposes on activities, but less attention 
is given to the consistency of values it applies to environmental 
effects through its decisions. The wide variety of parties who exercise 
decision roles under the act lack guidance on the economic value of 
the environment, and non-market valuation studies are too costly 
to be widely used and too few and varied to infer reliable generic 
values. Drawing on experience in estimating the public value of 
safety improvements, this article proposes an alternative approach 
that measures people’s aversion to the risk of environmental impacts 
of different scales and severity which could yield values sufficiently 
generic to be widely used, and outlines its uses both within and 
beyond the RMA applications.
Keywords Resource management, non-market valuation, risk, 
environmental accidents
While the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) attracts frequent criticism for imposing 
costs and delays on activities, less attention 
is paid to whether it consistently accounts 
for the environmental effects of its 
decisions across the country. Could a more 
coherent approach be adopted, rather 
than relying on the vagaries of particular 
councils, courts or individual decision 
makers? Our answer is ‘yes’ – by applying 
the approach proposed and developed in 
this article, which avoids the limitations of 
current evaluation approaches.
Although the RMA’s purpose includes 
providing for ‘economic well-being’ 
(section 2), the idea that environmental 
condition is part of the ‘consumption set’ 
that determines peoples’ well-being is not 
commonly considered in economic terms 
within the act’s evaluation processes. These 
are legislated by politicians, administered 
by planners and adjudicated by courts 
which emphasise legalistic and scientific 
aspects, with economic assessments largely 
focused on job creation and economic 
growth. Hence, the environment is valued 
in an ad hoc manner, implied through 
project approvals and other decisions. 
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This is unlikely to result in an optimal level 
of environmental protection across New 
Zealand since it leaves unanswered the 
economic question of how much is it worth 
to avoid adverse environmental effects?
The new and alternative approach 
combines the principles of environmental 
and safety valuation to deliver a flexible 
mechanism for environmental decision 
making, applicable not just to RMA 
decisions, but to other processes, such as 
biosecurity assessments, that consider 
environmental values. We term this a 
VMAEE (value of a major adverse effect on 
the environment), the reasons for which 
are considered below. 
The VMAEE sits within a wider context 
of economists’ varied attempts to place 
monetary value on things which do not 
have prices revealed in market trades. The 
natural environment has numerous 
‘missing markets’, sometimes because it is 
impractical to regulate the use of 
environmental resources (like the quality 
of the air we breathe) and sometimes 
because of what might be called 
‘administrative failure’ to define and enforce 
entitlements to use resources that could 
reveal value through trade. Markets can be 
created for some resources: tradable quotas 
for commercial fishing, for example, and 
emissions trading to tackle climate change. 
However, many environmental effects are 
too diffuse to enable well-functioning 
markets to be established.
Various methods have been devised to 
address this problem – e.g. non-market 
valuations of environmental resources – 
which have sometimes influenced resource 
use decisions (see, for instance, Harris and 
Meister, 1983). But applications of such 
methods can be time-consuming and 
costly, they address particular clients’ 
concerns, and in New Zealand at least there 
are too few estimates employing too widely 
varying methods to infer generic values for 
environmental resources such as water 
quality, biodiversity or natural settings. The 
cost of generating bespoke values has been 
prohibitive, so decisions will often be taken 
with no explicit economic values attached 
to environmental impacts. In such cases, 
economic values are implied by the 
decisions taken: for example, if a decision 
causes an environmental resource to 
contract, that resource is implicitly valued 
less than the opportunity cost of forgoing 
the project that alters it. Leaving decisions 
to be made without explicit focus on 
economic value by a variety of decision 
makers is not a recipe for efficient resource 
use.
These issues are not unique to New 
Zealand and can be placed in a wider 
context. Since the 1990s international 
agencies such as the World Bank, the 
OECD and the United Nations have steered 
a more consistent approach to placing 
values on the natural environment, driven 
by the premise that in the absence of a 
monetary value, the natural environment 
may not be properly taken into account in 
public policy deliberations at national or 
regional level, nor in private corporate 
decision making. The World Bank has 
developed frameworks for comprehensive 
wealth, inclusive wealth and genuine 
savings indicators which treat the 
environment as a source of natural capital 
to be measured alongside the produced 
capital of machinery and infrastructure, 
human capital (capabilities and skills), 
institutional capital (laws and governance) 
and net foreign assets.
In parallel with this, the United Nations 
has developed a System of Environmental 
Economic Accounting (SEEA), which sets 
standards for preparing natural resource 
accounts consistent with (but not part of) 
its System of National Accounts which 
records national economic aggregates like 
GDP. Its latest SEEA guidelines issued in 
2012 included a core framework covering 
resources that give rise to marketable goods 
(such as hydrocarbon and mineral stocks) 
and an experimental framework that 
covers non-market resources (like 
recreation space and biodiversity). Statistics 
New Zealand has prepared satellite 
accounts using SEEA’s core framework, on 
energy and minerals, water, fisheries and 
forestry (recently updated in Statistics New 
Zealand, 2018).
More recently, the notion of ecosystem 
services has received prominence through 
the UN-initiated Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment in 2005, and the United 
Kingdom’s National Ecosystem Assessment 
in 2011. The ecosystem services framework 
draws direct links between the condition 
of the natural environment’s ecosystems 
and the beneficial services of value it 
supplies to human activities, under four 
distinct categories of service: provisioning 
(supply of materials and energy), regulating 
(such as carbon sequestration and water 
flow moderation), cultural (settings for 
recreation, tourism and cultural heritage) 
and supporting (nutrient cycling and 
pollination). 
The UN’s SEEA, capital accounting and 
ecosystem services frameworks are all 
attempts at a more interdisciplinary 
approach to economic valuation, but 
integration of science and economics is not 
yet fully resolved. All have received official 
endorsement and are being implemented 
by governments to varying degree, but they 
are primarily oriented towards measuring 
stocks of natural resources, rather than the 
changes in environmental condition and 
flows of effects that result from individual 
policies, plan changes or consenting 
decisions. A further limiting feature is that 
the average values inferred from them are 
not the marginal values needed to assess 
individual policy changes or projects, 
which will vary with the conditions of 
abundance or scarcity in each situation. 
The principal use of these aggregate stock 
measures is in comparing periodic 
snapshots of the position of natural 
resources in the national economy, rather 
than in assessing whether a particular 
The [value of a major adverse effect on 
the environment] is primarily aimed at 
deriving marginal values that can inform 
decisions at individual project or policy 
change level. 
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project or plan change would produce 
benefits in excess of its full social costs, 
including costs of environmental changes.
The VMAEE is primarily aimed at 
deriving marginal values that can inform 
decisions at individual project or policy 
change level. It complements and serves a 
different purpose to the valuation of 
aggregate stocks in the SEEA. 
Valuing the seemingly priceless: the 
conceptual underpinnings of the VMAEE 
framework
The VMAEE combines two pre-existing 
economic frameworks: the total 
economic value (TEV) model of natural 
environmental resources with public good 
characteristics, which includes current 
use values, future use (or option) values 
and non-use (like existence and bequest) 
values;1 and the value of preventing a 
fatality (VPF) approach2 to valuing safety 
improvements in public sector projects. 
However, while we retain the essence of 
the TEV approach, we avoid the most 
trenchant criticism of environmental 
valuation studies – in New Zealand3 and 
elsewhere – which have focused on specific 
species or habitats, resulting in a myriad of 
site-specific values generated from one-off 
(costly) studies that risk overstating value 
in one context by under-accounting in 
others, and which sometimes have 
(mistakenly) been applied to valuing the 
current stock.4 VMAEE achieves this by 
adopting a multi-site approach, mirroring 
the VPF approach currently applied in 
transport appraisal of the value of 
preventing fatalities, which provides a 
utility-theoretic measure for safety. 
In that approach, safety has a clear unit 
of measure, whereby the VPF is the aggregate 
willingness to pay, summed over a large 
group of individuals, for small reductions 
in each individual’s risk of premature death, 
where the risk reductions are such that they 
will reduce the expected number of 
premature fatalities in the affected group by 
one and hence prevent one ‘statistical fatality’ 
in the forthcoming period. Applying the 
VPF means that the benefit of avoiding 
fatalities can be directly compared to its 
marginal costs, unlike in environmental 
assessment where the benefits of reducing 
the risk of environmental harm are only 
implicitly considered, or, worse, effectively 
valued at zero. 
The VPF is portable across any policy 
domain that has an impact on human 
safety. This is a particularly useful feature 
and provides the rationale for incorporating 
it as the second stage of our framework. It 
is conceptually simple in respect of how it 
treats the policy output – the prevention 
of a fatality – as no effort is made to 
distinguish between different accident 
types or different ways of dying in such an 
accident. This contrasts with environmental 
valuation, which often has multiple, diverse 
units of output measures – for example, 
particular species saved from extinction, 
characteristics of water quality, ill-defined 
‘amenity’ of landscapes – making it difficult 
to generalise any damages away from a 
specific site.
VPF also permits public preferences to 
be incorporated into appraisals in a 
transparent manner, consistent with 
economic theory. This contrasts with 
current RMA process, under which, even 
if the public is consulted, it is unclear how 
these consultations affect the final decision. 
The final distinguishing feature of the 
VPF is its integral treatment of risk. It is 
reduction in the risk of a fatality that is 
valued, not the certain death of an 
identified person. Our framework 
incorporates this principle, unlike standard 
environmental valuation, which often 
posits (certain) changes in environmental 
attributes. 
The distinction made above between a 
multi-layered, complex environment and 
simpler preferences for protecting human 
life should not preclude the adoption of a 
VPF-style approach to environmental 
valuation. A VPF is a single clear entity 
which becomes a benchmark value which 
can be adjusted for use in other contexts. 
In environmental matters, there is no such 
benchmark value except in rare cases such 
as global carbon credits, leaving councils, 
Environment Court judges and even 
sometimes central  government 
policymakers without guidance on 
economic value when deciding what weight 
to place on protecting or allowing change 
in the natural environment. In many 
situations, it is difficult to build up a 
tailored layer cake of values that reflect all 
the facets of environmental change, 
without resorting to values transferred 
from elsewhere or averages that do not 
accurately reflect the marginal choices. 
Seeking public preferences to avert the risk 
of different scales of impact, without being 
precise on details, may have its limitations, 
but does have the advantage that it replaces 
the zero price implicitly applied to 
environmental change in much RMA 
decision making, which must surely be a 
gross underestimate. At the very least it 
removes the current anomaly in New 
Zealand whereby the transport sector 
explicitly values the protection of humans 
and directly embeds it into policy while 
environmental protection remains 
unquantified.
Value of a major adverse effect on the 
environment (VMAEE) framework
Although the VMAEE framework is 
pitched at a higher level than individual 
species, sites or attributes, it also has an 
inbuilt flexibility that can accommodate 
differing severities of environmental 
harm. It explicitly recognises that, for 
some aspects of environmental value, 
protection of existing features may be 
mission-critical (e.g. habitat essential 
Although the VMAEE framework is 
pitched at a higher level than individual 
species, sites or attributes, it also has an 
inbuilt flexibility that can accommodate 
differing severities of environmental 
harm. 
A New Approach to Environmental Valuation for New Zealand
Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018 – Page 53
for species survival), but for others 
some level of change may be acceptable 
because of substitution possibilities (e.g. 
recreation transferring from native to 
planted forests). It also requires a bridge 
between the valuation both of safety 
and of environmental impacts. This 
is provided by the concept of a major 
accident to the environment (MATTE), 
which underpins the Control of Major 
Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 
1999 in the UK,5 but has no equivalent in 
New Zealand. In RMA language it might 
be termed a major adverse effect on the 
environment (MAEE). An MAEE would 
be flexible enough to cover both the risk 
of immediate catastrophic loss and the 
‘accident by stealth’ of continued exposure 
to risk of degradation. 
Applying the MAEE
Defining major environmental ‘accident’ 
scenarios in terms of scale, long- and 
short-term effects and the extent of 
impact on human population centres or 
natural areas allows non-market valuation 
techniques to be applied to establish 
people’s preferences for reducing the 
risk of different combinations of effects 
at a range of prices, thus capturing the 
reduction in TEV from an MAEE. The 
arguments for and against different 
valuation methods and the often-voiced 
reservations about their validity are well 
rehearsed elsewhere and are not repeated 
here (see, for instance, NZIER, 2010; 
Pearce, Atkinson and Mourato, 2006). This 
does not negate the conceptual framework 
underpinning VMAEE elicitation but 
will undoubtedly have an impact on its 
empirical application. A VMAEE elicited 
using state-of the-art methods will clearly 
be less prone to error and bias than one 
elicited under outdated practices. 
Operationalising the VMAEE
The VPF is the value of reducing the risk 
of the most severe life ‘event’, death, but 
reducing the risk of non-fatal injuries 
of varying severity is also used in 
regulatory analysis, requiring a value of 
preventing injury (VPI).6 Likewise, our 
framework also accommodates adverse 
environmental effects of differing severity. 
Thus, an MAEE might be so serious that 
any environmental losses are irreversible 
(e.g. global extinction of a species, or the 
extinction of a keystone species in a habitat 
of national significance), but others might 
have a different scale and significance – e.g. 
serious but without the irreversibility of 
potential losses (localised extinction of a 
species abundant elsewhere). Quantifying 
the VPF is straightforward: it is calculated 
by dividing mean willingness to pay by 
the risk reduction.7 The environmental 
analogue value – the VMAEE – would 
be calculated in similar manner, with less 
serious adverse effects scaled accordingly. 
Defining a VMAEE requires overlaying 
the VPF concept with the components of 
TEV. As an illustrative, not prescriptive, 
example, Figure 1 delineates a VMAEE in 
terms of the degree of severity of 
environmental damage, and demonstrates 
how each environmental outcome maps to 
value. We restrict this to three types of 
MAEE, although more could be included 
and gradations could exist between these 
three types: for instance, an effect with 
characteristics of a major VMAEE except 
for the availability of close substitutes 
elsewhere would attract lesser value than a 
full major VMAEE, but perhaps higher 
value than the moderate VMAEE. In simple 
terms, environmental degradation that has 
a negative impact on human well-being 
reduces one or more of option value (OV), 
existence value (EV) or use value (UV). 
The value of reducing the risk of MAEEs 
of different severities is captured by the 
public’s willingness to pay (in the same way 
as VPF is calculated). This will result in a 
range of indicative values for differing 
environmental effects and how the values 
change at the margin.
This differs crucially from existing 
approaches to project appraisal. Rather 
than having to determine the weight to be 
applied to individual environmental effects, 
the impact of these adverse effects is 
combined and assigned to varying 
categories of severity, determined by 
scientific/ecological characteristics. 
Economics can also inform this 
categorisation: for instance, scarcity and 
irreversibility enhance value, whereas 
abundance, availability of substitutes and 
ease of reproduction have the opposite 
effect. But the VMAEE is inherently 
interdisciplinary in approach. Economists 
need to draw on other disciplines’ experts 
in characterising the nature and 
probabilities of accidental outcomes for the 
environment in the different severity 
scenarios, but once the values have been 
estimated they can be entered into the 
wider policy process, which includes both 
Figure 1: A VMAEE incorporating decreasing severity of environmental impact
MAJOR
VMAEE
MODERATE
VMAEE
MINOR
VMAEE
Characteristics Characteristics Characteristics
Major Environmental
Loss (EV) 
Serious Environmental
Detriment (EV) 
Minor Environmental
Impairment (EV) 
Nationally Significant
Impact (OV) 
Nationally Significant
Impact (OV) 
Locally Significant
Impact (OV) 
Irreversible Loss (OV) Loss Recoverable in
Long Term (OV) 
Loss Recoverable in
Short Term (OV) 
No Close Substitutes
(UV) 
Substitutes at High
Cost (UV) 
Substitutes at low
cost (UV) 
Examples
Species extinction
Loss of unique
cultural artefacts
Major landscape loss
and transformation
Examples
Habitat reduction
Loss of nationally
significant recreation
space
Loss of mature
landscape features
Contamination of land,
water or biosphere   
Examples
Minor habitat change
Loss of locally
significant recreation
space
Minor landscape
change 
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economic and non-economic considera-
tions.
Deriving and applying a VMAEE in resource 
management
Derivation
Here we illustrate a hypothetical 
application of the framework at national 
level, although it could be amended 
to a smaller operational scale. Under 
this scenario, the government, through 
the RMA, sets the frame for regulating 
environmental harm (or preservation) 
across the country. A priori, it is unknown 
which particular site will be affected; 
instead there is a small risk at all sites. Thus, 
any value which reflects this risk can be 
applied to any proposed project (or to any 
site that might be vulnerable to adverse 
effects).
To be applicable at the national level we 
assume that at least some people derive 
existence value and/or some people would 
adopt an altruistic stance (Aldred, 1994), 
and hence be prepared to contribute to the 
prevention or reduction in the risk of an 
MAEE elsewhere in the country as well as 
in their immediate neighbourhood. This 
allows us to draw directly on the conceptual 
framework in Appendix 1 to inform the 
design of any empirical study to estimate 
a VMAEE.8
Willingness to pay values could be 
derived from various methods: e.g. hedonic 
pricing methods, random utility travel cost 
models, contingent valuation or choice 
modelling (Freeman, Herriges and Kling, 
2014). We develop our example in the 
context of a choice experiment (based on 
Lancaster’s (1966) model of consumer 
preferences and widely applied in health 
(Ryan et al., 2006), transportation (Hensher 
and Rose, 2005) and the environment 
(Adamowicz et al., 1998)). This could be 
informed by deliberative processes or focus 
groups which examine potential trade-offs 
in depth, and which can be used to refine 
the questions before applying them to a 
wider sample survey representative of the 
population at large.
In a VMAEE context, people’s utility is 
a function of the different environmental 
attributes and the reduction in risk to these 
attributes. To facilitate generalisability and 
avoid the site-specificity problems 
discussed above, broad sets of attributes at 
risk of damage are defined in TEV terms. 
Respondents would first be made aware of 
the current conditions with respect to 
biodiversity significance, recreational 
opportunities and so on. They would then 
face a series of choice sets (see example in 
Figure 2) consisting of two or more 
differently specified, but related, sets in 
which they indicate their most preferred 
option.9 By varying the attributes, levels of 
risk and price across choice sets, marginal 
values for each attribute can be recovered 
directly via econometric procedures 
(Freeman, Herriges and Kling, 2014), while 
estimates of overall welfare gains from the 
intervention as a whole can also be 
estimated (indirectly).
Moving forward, assume that a mean 
willingness to pay for a reduction in a risk 
to the environment has been estimated 
from a sample of New Zealand households. 
Appendix 2 considers a simple example of 
reducing the risk of an MAEE by 1 in 
100,000 per site and shows how this can be 
aggregated into a societal value for this risk 
reduction – i.e. a VMAEE. This ex ante 
measure assumes that at the time of 
enactment the policy will be expected to 
prevent one adverse event in the 
forthcoming period, although in some 
periods more than one adverse event may 
be prevented and, in some periods, none. 
This mirrors the VPF, which is the value of 
preventing one fatality on average in the 
next period. 
A VMAEE in this form could 
complement rather than supplant other 
forms of environmental valuation, by 
indicating public value of protection 
against the risk of adverse effects that 
cannot be valued in other ways. This is 
similar to the VPF, which is sometimes 
called the human cost of accidents, and 
combined with other accident cost 
estimates such as the cost of property 
damage, emergency services attending the 
scene, policing, and justice system costs 
that may follow if fault is established. Thus, 
the VMAEE would not preclude the use of 
biodiversity offsets as a means of mitigating 
the environmental impacts: if a choice set 
includes offsets, the reduction in risk to 
biodiversity would be assigned a less major 
VMAEE than it would if offsets were not 
feasible.
Applications
We now consider how the VMAEE 
approach could inform decisions made on 
biosecurity, freshwater management, the 
RMA and national living standards.
Ecosystems
In biosecurity, a key issue is what value 
should be placed on avoiding risks to 
species or habitats that are unique to New 
Zealand. There are periodic incursion 
risks, such as myrtle rust which threatens 
indigenous trees such as mänuka and the 
red-flowering pöhutukawa. There are also 
chronic risks from established introduced 
predators like stoats and possums, against 
which the government has granted 
initial funding of $28 million towards 
making New Zealand predator-free by 
2050. Diminishing returns and increasing 
Figure 2: An Example VMAEE Choice Set
ATTRIBUTE CHOICE A CHOICE B STATUS QUO
Risk: Habitat loss Reduced by 10% No change High
Risk: Landscape Change increased by 2% Increased by 5% Low
Risk: Contamination No Change Reduced by 10% Medium
Recreation Improved trails (10%) Improved trails (15%) No improvement
Location 100 km away 1 km away 50 km away
Cost NZ$30 NZ$50 NZ$0
Note: Risk reductions could be presented as 1/100, for example  
Location can be expressed in distance bands to a site for a representative New Zealand
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marginal costs may make eradicating the 
last breeding specimens prohibitively 
expensive, but policymakers are still 
interested in how much the public is 
willing to pay for more intensive predator 
management than is currently achieved.10
Protecting more habitats and wildlife 
communities lowers the probability of their 
being driven to extinction. A VMAEE could 
help infer societal values for risk and help 
prioritise how much habitat to protect and 
where, informing the trade-off between 
social and scientific objectives, although in 
some cases, such as risks involving pivotal 
keystone species, scientific considerations 
may continue to dominate. For example, in 
a New Zealand context, the Department of 
Conservation may have some scientifically 
determined bottom lines in terms of the 
portfolio of sites it needs to secure the 
survival of species, a representative 
diversity of habitats and the supply of 
ecosystem services. But the VMAEE could 
show the relative public value of securing 
environmental condition above those levels, 
which could assist the department with its 
priority setting and in demonstrating 
public value from extra investment funding. 
Freshwater management
Deteriorating freshwater quality has 
recently risen in public awareness, due 
partly to agricultural intensification, 
which increases nutrient discharges to the 
environment, and partly to one-off events 
like the 2015 gastroenteritis outbreak in 
Havelock North, attributed to intrusion 
of faecal matter from sheep pastures into 
bores during rainstorms. These raise 
questions about the value of protecting 
surface water quality and groundwater 
against contamination, reducing the risk 
of infection from contact with water.
The question is whether the costs of so 
doing are justified by the benefits of 
reducing the frequency of such 
contamination. Risk of contamination 
varies with localised factors, such as the 
depth of aquifers, the location of recharge 
areas and the population potentially at risk 
– all matters which could be reflected in a 
VMAEE. Where water contamination has 
wider ramifications – e.g. affecting New 
Zealand’s reputation as a tourist destination 
– a VMAEE could be informative in 
considering national assistance to poorer 
communities to enable them to reach a 
higher basic standard.
A VMAEE could also inform the 
National Policy Statement for Freshwater 
Management, which in 2014 set a national 
objective of improving the quality of all 
freshwater bodies to safely ‘wadeable’. This 
was amended in 2017 with a new target of 
90% of all rivers and lakes being safely 
‘swimmable’ by 2040 (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2017). At what point would 
the costs incurred exceed the benefits 
gained? A VMAEE could help determine 
this by providing a comparable monetary 
value of benefits to assist in identifying 
where to prioritise improving water quality.
The RMA
The RMA has come under increasing 
scrutiny over whether it appropriately 
balances the needs of development 
and environmental protection. Since 
coming into force, there have been 21 
amendment acts and 34 regulations 
issued to give direction for more consistent 
implementation by the 16 regional 
authorities and 68 district and city 
councils that exercise powers under the act. 
Disputes under the act have recourse to 
the Environment Court, whose decisions 
can be appealed in the High Court, so the 
judiciary also influences implementation.
There are unavoidable trade-offs 
between environment and economic 
outcome in every decision under the act, 
but little guidance exists on how to make 
these trade-offs in economic terms. For 
RMA applications for local plan changes 
or consents for new land uses or discharges 
into air and water, the decision makers are 
left to weigh the benefits of approval 
against the localised environmental 
changes and an overlay of national 
priorities. Experts on ecology, visual 
amenity and recreation may assess the 
significance of an affected site from their 
own perspectives, but consideration of 
economic consequences is often limited to 
potential impacts on jobs and incomes, not 
the potential losses people face from 
changes in the environment and their 
willingness to pay to reduce the risk of loss, 
as captured by TEV. This can result in 
perverse outcomes: for instance, 
authorising the destruction of very rare 
habitats to enable a project that would 
create jobs and outputs that could be 
readily replicated by relocating the activity 
elsewhere.11 A VMAEE would provide 
objective guidance on the relative value of 
different potential losses and improve 
consistency of decisions.
The government
The Treasury could adapt the VMAEE 
approach to its Living Standards 
Framework to place monetary values on 
natural capital (see van Zul and Au, 2018) 
and changes in environmental outcomes 
over time. The VMAEE approach could 
also be used to provide a monetary 
overlay to the initiatives of Ministry for the 
Environment and Statistics New Zealand 
in environmental reporting (see Ministry 
for the Environment, 2015), and be a step 
towards more explicit consideration of the 
economic value of (changes in) natural 
stocks than the natural resource satellite 
accounts prepared using the UN SEEA 
guidance for fisheries, forests, minerals and 
water (see Statistics New Zealand, 2018). 
The approach can also be used by other 
government departments, e.g. the Ministry 
for Primary Industries and agencies 
wherever there are environments at risk 
The VMAEE framework developed in this 
article combines the existing frameworks 
of TEV and the VPF applied to safety 
and adapts them to derive valuations 
of public aversion to risks to the 
environment. 
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Concluding comments
The VMAEE framework developed 
in this article combines the existing 
frameworks of TEV and the VPF applied 
to safety and adapts them to derive 
valuations of public aversion to risks to 
the environment. It complies with the 
economic principle of marginal values, 
but also meets policymakers’ needs for 
flexibility, consistency and transparency. It 
can generate a small number of values that 
can be applied in any domain, ensuring 
that environmental resources are given the 
same weight across different sectors, while 
acknowledging that some Department 
of Conservation preservation activities 
with hard-to-ascertain probabilities and 
involving potentially irreversible outcomes 
can still be determined separately. In 
providing such a framework, we place 
the environment at the heart of, rather 
than adjunct to, economic decisions over 
natural resources in New Zealand.
The VMAEE serves a different purpose 
from the valuations of stocks in the SEEA. 
But it has some overlap with the ecosystem 
services approach, which provides a 
typography for identifying services from 
the natural environment that can be valued 
and mapped against TEV (as in Appendix 
1). There is potential to develop this linkage 
in future as both the VMAEE and ecosystem 
services approaches evolve.
The advantages of the VMAEE are that 
it generalises the object of valuation 
around the scale and characteristics of 
environmental risks, rather than valuing 
specific environmental features, which may 
affect the non-market valuation responses 
(for example, charismatic ‘mega-fauna’ 
attract higher survey response values than 
do less visible but rarer species more 
pivotal in ecosystem functioning). It would 
be less prone to ‘focus illusion’, which lifts 
the values of subjects by bringing attention 
to them, and which also contributes to the 
widely reported ‘part–whole bias’, in which 
respondents indicate similar value for 
environmental attributes of greatly 
different scale and significance. And having 
a single suite of values for effects of 
different severity derived by a common 
method would be more widely applicable, 
and ultimately less costly to obtain, than 
the assortment of current ad hoc valuation 
estimates of specific issues. 
1 Built on ideas attributed to Krutilla, 1967. 
2 VPF is equivalent to the value of statistical life (VSL) seen in 
some literature. We use VPF here following practice in the 
UK, where it is considered a more accurate description of 
what it does: see Clough, Guria and Bealing (2015).
3 For example, Lincoln University hosts a New Zealand non-
market valuation database with summary details of over 150 
empirical studies applying various methods to recreation, 
pollution, aesthetics, risk, transport and environmental 
protection; however, these provide insufficient estimates on 
particular topics to infer reliable generic estimates.
4 An example of this, which combines environmental 
consumer surplus values with GDP without adjusting for 
consumer surpluses on non-environmental consumption, is 
Costanza et al. (1997). While this approach allows society 
to track the value of stock over time, it is not appropriate to 
the type of natural resource management addressed in this 
article.
5 The mechanism by which the UK implements the Seveso 
Directive (82/501/EEC).
6 For example, the NZ Transport Agency values the reduction 
in risk of serious injury (requiring hospitalisation) at 10% of 
the VPF.
7 For instance, if the average willingness to pay to reduce 
the risk of fatality by 1 in 100,000 is $20, society’s 
willingness to pay to avoid one anonymous fatality, the VPF, 
is $20÷0.0000001=$2 million (Lindhjem and Navrud, 
2010). 
8 Further assumptions would be required to enable the 
VMAEE to be used in economic regulation, although we do 
not develop them formally here. As in the VPF, we assume 
financial risk aversion and prudence with respect to current 
wealth. The environment is considered a normal good, so 
a person places higher value on a larger than a smaller 
reduction in a particular environmental hazard.
9 Following standard practice, such surveys are subject to 
extensive pre-testing and piloting to ensure that respondents 
understand the information and tasks, while retaining their 
scientific validity.
10 By comparison, in 2014 the Department of Conservation 
spent $31 million on pest control, mainly on reserve areas, 
and Operational Solutions for Primary Industry (OSPRI) 
spent $47 million on control of bovine Tb vectors on 
farmland and interstitial bush areas. The cost of ridding 
the country of introduced predators has been estimated at 
between $9 billion and $31 billion.
11 For example, on the Escarpment mine on the Denniston 
Plateau, the Environmental Court granted consent for 
an opencast coal mine that would destroy habitats that 
ecological experts for both sides agreed were extremely rare, 
although the economic benefits of jobs and incomes could 
be obtained from extraction elsewhere, as coal is not scarce 
in the region.
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Appendix 1: Total Economic Value And Ecosystem Services
Total Economic Value approach
Value Category Sub- Category Value from… Ecosystem services
Non- use Value
Existence value Retaining species, sites, habitats for their own sake Cultural services
Su
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Bequest value Retaining unique natural features for future generations
Non- material services obtained 
from ecosystems
Scientific value Potential for new scientific and educational understanding
Spiritual/culture value Deeper experience of a place that transcends amenity, associative and commemorative values
Commemorative value Connections with a significant event, idea or person
Associative value Essential element of wider identity
Amenity/aesthetics Visual qualities of physical attributes
Future Use Value
Quasi- option value Retaining potential until better informed
Option value Retaining potential to use in future Regulatory services
Current Use Value
Indirect use value Use supports other activities Benefits from regulating services of ecosystems
Direct use value Provisioning services
Non- consumptive Use does not deplete resource Products obtained from  
ecosystems (food, materials, 
energy, water)
Consumptive use Use extracts or depletes resource
Aggregate annual WTP = $V x 1.47 x 106  (1)  
 ...Discounted present value of aggregate WTP over 20 years at public sector discount rate of 4% 
per annum
 = $V x 1.47 x 106 x 14.2 (2)
 = $V x 20.9 x 106  (3)
Expected number of MAEE prevented over 20 years as a result of risk reduction
 = 1000 x (10-4- 10-6) x 20 (4)
 = 1000 x (99 x 10-6) x 20 (5)
 = 1.98  (6)
This is typically referred to as the prevention of 1.98 “statistical” MAEE.  Hence from (3) and (6) the 
aggregate WTP-based value per statistical MAEE prevented = 
   $V x 20 x 106
  19.8 
(7)
 = $V x 10.1 x 10   (8)
 However, the overall reduction in risk per MAEE site
 = (10-4- 10-6) x 20  (9)
 = 99 x 10-6 x 20  (10)
 = 1.98 x 10-3   (11)
 Hence the WTP-based value of the 20 year reduction 
in risk per MAEE site
 = ($V x 10.1 x 106) x 1.98 x 10-3 (12)
 = $V x 0.020 x 106  (13)
 = $V x 0.020 million  (14)
It is then easy to calculate the value of a 20 year risk reduction for a MAEE site for different mean 
WTP amounts. If mean annual WTP per household was $2.50 a VMAEE would be $51,900 while a 
$200 mean annual household WTP would generate a VMAEE of over $4.0 million. Table A1.1 
contains implied VMAEES for WTP amounts between these two values.  Note that this value applies 
to each MAEE site.
Table A2.1 Implied VMAEES for Different 
Household Mean WTP
Mean annual 
household 
willingness to pay
Value of 20 year 
risk reduction per 
MAEE site $’000
$2.50 51.9
$5.00 103.9
$10.00 207.8
$20.00 415.5
$50.00 1,038.8
$100.00 2,077.7
$200.00 4,155.4
Appendix 2:  Calculating And Applying A VMAEE For Policy
